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Although the Colgate court was aware of the undesirability
of adopting existing stereotypes as standards to be used in the
interpretation of Title VII's exception and the necessity of effecting the purpose of Title VII through the elimination of undesirable motives as a basis for establishing a practice which comes
within the exception, the court has not effectively implemented
these policies. Further consideration must be given to refine its
application of these policies.

Commercial Paper: Postal Money Orders
Receive Negotiable Equality
Postal money order blanks were stolen from a post office
station, validated with an all purpose stamp, forged with the
initials of an issuing employee, and presented to defendant bank
for payment. The orders were ordinary on their face, and the
bank, in good faith, paid the thief and forwarded the orders to
the Federal Reserve Bank for reimbursement. The government
paid them as a matter of course. Upon discovery of the forgery,
the government demanded return of the money paid, which the
bank refused. On cross motions for summary judgment,1 the
federal district court held that there was no duty of restitution
if the bank paid value for orders ordinary on their face and received payment without reason to know of the forgery and
lack of authorization. United States v. First National Bank, 263
F. Supp. 298 (D. Mass. 1967).
The general rule, originating in equity courts, is that a payor
may obtain restitution of money paid another if the payor was
deprived of the expected exchange because of his mistake of
fact as to some essential element of the contract.2 An excep1. The law determining the rights and obligations of persons
dealing with postal money orders is either federal statutory law or
federal common law. See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318
U.S. 363 (1943). In United States v. Cambridge Trust Co., Civil No.
60-319-W (D. Mass., March 24, 1961), the court suggested that some of

the sources for such judicially fashioned federal common law might
include state commercial law, the Negotiable Instruments Law, the Uniform Commercial Code, and the British statutes with respect to bills
and notes. See also United States v. Cambridge Trust Co., 300 F.2d 76
(1st Cir. 1962).
2. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 15 (1937). The policy underlying this position is that where there has been a payment under mistake of fact, it would be inequitable to allow the recipient to retain the
benefit of the mistake, thereby unjustly enriching him. See, e.g., Peerless Glass Co. v. Pacific Crockery Co., 121 Cal. 641, 54 P. 101 (1898);
Strong v. Lane, 66 Minn. 94, 68 N.W. 765 (1896); Rackemann v. Riverbank

Imp. Co., 167 Mass. 1, 44 N.E. 990 (1896).
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tion to this doctrine, known as the rule of Price v. Neal,3 is that
when the holder of a negotiable imstrument receives payment
from the drawee on a forged signatme of the drawer, he has no
duty of restitution if he has paid value and received payment
without reason to know of the forgery.4 The Uniform Commercial Code adopts this exception in section 3-418.5 Its purpose is
to promote free marketability of negotiable commercial paper
by according finality to payments made by the drawee where
his drawer's signature is forged. Thus, the mercantile transaction is concluded with the surrender of the instrument and no
action for recovery of payment based on mistake is allowed.
Prior to 1951, the Postmaster General was authorized by statute to establish a uniform money order system at all suitable
post offices.6 The purpose of this system was to afford the
public greater convenience and security in the transfer of money
through the mails. In United States v. Stockgrowers" National
BankJ the court held that money orders were essentially transfers of funds between post office stations, never injected into
commercial channels and, therefore, not negotiable instruments.
Thus, the government was allowed to recover payments for
fraudulently issued money orders on the theory that the money
was paid under mistake of fact." A second defense for the government was established in United States v. Northwestern National Bank & Trust Company.9 There the government was permitted to recover payments made on forged instruments on the
ground that when the government issued money orders it was
exercising a sovereign function rather than engaging in a commercial activity. 10
3. 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (K.B. 1762). See note 26 infra.
4. RESTATEMENT OF REsTITUTIoN
CTAL CODE § 3-418 [hereinafter cited as

§ 30 (1937); UNIFORM COMMERU.C.C.].

5. See U.C.C. § 3-418, Comment 2.
6. Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 102, 17 Stat. 297.
7. 30 F. 912 (D. Colo. 1887). There are relatively few decisions
considering postal money orders.

This paucity probably results from

the fact that money orders may not be issued for an amount in excess of
$100 and hence, under most circumstances, it is economically prohibitive to bring or defend an action on them. It is only when a substantial number are involved (sixty-three in the instant case) that their
legal status is questioned.
8. See also Bolognesi v. United States, 189 F. 335 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 223 U.S. 726 (1911); United States v. Northwestern Natl Bank
& Trust Co., 35 F. Supp. 484 (D. Minn. 1940); Lewin v. United States,
170 F. Supp. 646 (Ct. Cl. 1959); Jaselli v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 36 App. D.C.
159 (1911).
9. 35 F. Supp. 484 (D. Minn. 1940).
10. Id. at 489. The court rejected the applicability of Price v. Neal
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In 1951 the uniform money order system was changed to
permit money orders to be cashed in banks as well as post offices.1 1 This change, designed to increase the circulation of postal
money orders, increased the similarity between money orders
and negotiable instruments.
To be negotiable under the Uniform Commercial Code,12 an
instrument must be an unconditional promise or order'13 to
pay a sum certain in money 14 at a determinable time,' 5 and comply with the provisions governing negotiability 6 and transferability.1 7 While the article governing negotiable instruments applies only to instruments within this definition, it does not preclude similar treatment of nonnegotiable instruments.' 8 Moreover, a limited application of the law merchant to instruments
not squarely within the language of the U.C.C. 19 is permissible.
to money orders. It held the doctrine was based on public policy, a
policy superseded by a need to protect the government in issuing instruments in connection with the performance of a public duty. The
case was criticized on the grounds that it placed an unfair burden on
both holders and payors of money orders, 40 MICn. L. REV. 108 (1941).
Contra, 25 MUNN. L. REv. 516 (1941); 14 S. CAL. L. REV. 471 (1941). See
generally Wachtell, Sovereign Immunity and Its Application to Commercial Paper, 6 BRooKLYN L. RSv. 1 (1936).

11. 39 U.S.C. § 5101 (1964). 39 CFR § 171.3 (b) (1) (1967) provides
that money orders may be cashed at any post office or bank, and
presently, 99% of all such orders issued are collected through the
Federal Reserve Banks.
12. U.C.C. § 3-104 codifies the criteria which must be met before
an instrument may be negotiable within the terms of Article Three.
The court in Quality Fin. Co. v. Hurley, 337 Mass. 150, 155, 148 N.E.2d
385, 389 (1958), referred to this section as combining provisions "comparable" to those of the Negotiable Instruments Law all within one
section.
13. U.C.C. § 3-105. A postal money order is an unconditional order to pay within the tenor of this section, notwithstanding the limitations imposed by 39 U.S.C. § 5104 (1964). One construction of this section, United States v. Farrington, 172 F. Supp. 797 (D. Mass. 1959), held
that if an instrument contains the phrase "subject to" the terms of another document, that such a reference would be fatal to negotiabiltity
regardless of the provisions of the other document.
14. U.C.C. §§ 3-106, 3-107, 1-201(24).
15. U.C.C. §§ 3-108, 3-109.
16. U.C.C. §§ 3-202, 3-206.
17. U.C.C. § 3-201.
18. U.C.C. § 3-104, Comment 2, provides that a result similar to
negotiability may also be reached with respect to nonnegotiable paper,
as through estoppel. See, e.g., Brown v. Scales, 109 Ga. App. 138, 135
S.E.2d 525 (1964).
19. U.C.C. §§ 3-104, 3-805. While postal money orders are not
negotiable instruments under the Code, they must be treated as mercantile specialties rather than as simple contracts. See, e.g., United
States v. Bank of New York, 219 F. 648 (2d Cir. 1914); President &
Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Morgan, 242 N.Y. 38, 150 N.E. 594 (1926).
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Money orders are distinguishable from negotiable instruments in
that the former are statutorily limited to one endorsement, contrary to the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 20 and
are made payable "to" the payee, 21 rather than payable either
"to order" or "to bearer."
Yet, while money orders do not possess all the qualities of
negotiable instruments, 22 they do have many of the characteristics of, and circulate as freely as, negotiable instruments. Consequently, decisions subsequent to 1951 have tended to erode the
earlier rationalizations which permitted the government to recover from holders of unauthorized money orders. In United

States v. Citizens & Southern National Bank,2 3 the court rejected

the rationale expressed in Northwestern and denied the government recovery because of its negligent supervision of its employees. 24 It also noted that although money orders are technically nonnegotiable, they are widely used in commerial transactions and, therefore, the transferee should be given protection
comparable to the endorsee of a negotiable instrument. The

court in United States v. Cambridge Trust Company25 continued

See generally Aigler, Recognition of New Types of Negotiable Instruments, 24 COLum. L. REV. 563 (1924); Goodrich, Nonnegotiable Bills and
Notes, 5 IowA L. BuLL. 65 (1920).

20. Compare U.C.C. § 3-104 and § 3-206 with 39 U.S.C. § 5104

(1964).

21. U.C.C. § 3-805 provides that an instrument not payable to order
or bearer, shall, if it is otherwise negotiable and its terms do not
prohibit transfer, be governed by the Code, except that the transferee
cannot be a holder in due course. It would seem that the instant court
is treating defendant bank as a holder in due course. In Strauss v.
State, 113 Ga. App. 90, 147 S.E.2d 367 (1966), the court held that bank
money orders which were not payable to order or bearer were not
negotiable instruments under the Code, even though their appearance
would suggest to the purchaser that they were negotiable.
22. U.C.C. §§ 3-104, 3-206. The Code requires that to be a negotiable instrument, a writing must be an unconditional promise to pay a
sum certain. 39 U.S.C. § 5104 (1964) limits negotiation to one endorsement, contrary to the Code policy of unrestricted transferability. See
Lewin v. United States, 170 F. Supp. 646 (Ct. Cl. 1959). However, 39
U.S.C. § 5104 (1964) is, in fact, merely an explication of commercial
reality, since checks, as demand instruments, presume immediate presentment for payment without numerous endorsements or transfers.
23. 144 F. Supp. 601 (S.D. Ga. 1956).
24. In United States v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 35
F. Supp. 484, 486 (1940), the court held that negligence would not
prejudice the position of the government while engaging in a sovereign
function.
25. 300 F.2d 76 (1st Cir. 1962). The court denied the government
recovery on an agency basis, another exception to the general rule of
restitution for payment by mistake of fact. Under this exception, payment by mistake to a known agent, followed by payment over by the
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the erosion of the prior position of nonnegotiability by holding
that money orders were neither negotiable nor nonnegotiable,
but sui generis to commercial paper.
The court in the instant case rejected the defendant's contention that the post-1951 postal money orders were negotiable
instruments under the Uniform Commercial Code and that section 3-418 prohibited recovery by the government. Yet it indicated that money orders were so similar to negotiable instruments that nearly all of the policy considerations behind section
3-418 and the rule of Price v. Nea126 were applicable. First, the
court noted that bona fide purchasers of money orders, just
as holders in due course of negotiable instruments, should be
assured that their purchase of the instrument will pass ownership to them. 27 It felt that denial of this protection to money
agent to its principal, in good faith, and without notice of any adverse
claims, does not give rise to liability on the part of the agent. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) or AGENCY § 339, comment f, at 99 (1958); RESTATESee Hooper v. Robinson, 98 U.S. 528
MENT OF RESTETUTION § 24 (1937).
(1878); United States v. Bethke, 132 F. Supp. 22 (D. Colo. 1955); Insurance Co. of N. America v. Fourth Nat'l Bank, 14 F.2d 131 (N.D. Ga.
1926).
26. 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (K.B. 1762). This rule has been incorporated
into U.C.C. § 3-418. Unique to negotiable instruments, it is designed to
make payments on an instrument final in favor of a holder in due
course, contrary to the normal legal obligation to repay money received
through mistake of fact in the simple contract situation. Prior to its
codification in the Negotiable Instruments Law, § 62, the rule was
already a fundamental principle in the law of negotiable instruments.
See, e.g., Bank of United States v. Bank of Georgia, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.)
333 (1825); First Nat'l Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 151 Mass. 280, 24 N.E.
44 (1890).
There have been four general theories supporting the proposition
that the drawee cannot recover money paid another on a check or other
instrument bearing a forged maker's signature: the drawee was negligent in failing to detect the forgery; the drawee is estopped to deny
what he has already admitted by paying the item, i.e., the genuineness
of his drawer's signature; the consideration of finality of commercial
transactions; and there is no superior equity in the drawee which would
require shifting the loss. The theory that public policy demands finality
of payment in commercial transactions is given the most credence, Dedham Nat'l Bank v. Everett Nat'l Bank, 177 Mass. 392, 59 N.E. 62 (1901),
and this is the position adopted by the Uniform Commercial Code.
However, Professor Ames argues that there is a lack of superior equity
in the claimant who is seeking recovery and that as between two persons of equal equities, there would be no compelling reason to redistribute the loss in any other manner than has already occurred. Ames,
The Doctrine of Price v. Neal, 4 HARV. L. REv. 297 (1891). See KEENER,
ON QuAsI-CoNTRACTS (1893); WOODWARD, THE LAW Os' QUAsI-CONTRACT §
86 (1913); Aigler, The Doctrine of Price v. Neal, 24 Mcn. L. REV. 809
(1926); Note, Current Status of Price v. Neal in New York, 13 SYRACUSE
L. REv. 426 (1962).

27. See O'Malley, Legal Aspects of Postal Money Orders, 52 CoRN.
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orders would reduce the market for them and create a reluctance within the banking community to accept them. This would
contravene the government's purpose for issuing the orders by
detracting from the convenience and security of the public in
28
transferring money through the mails.
Furthermore, the court pointed out that the position of the
post office would in no way be prejudiced by the denial of this
claim, for it is in a superior position to protect itself against the
payment of fraudulent money orders. The Post Office Department could arrange with the Federal Reserve Banks to make
only provisional credit to the accounts of the collecting banks
until final payment had been authorized through the Audit
Division of the Post Office Department, thus eliminating the
situation found in the instant case. Hence, the court held that
the bank, in receiving payment for the money order, which appeared regular on its face but which in part bore forged authorization, did not become obligated to give restitution to the
government if it paid value and received payment without reason to know of the forgery and lack of authorization.
This rule seems desirable, for the government is in the best
position to defend itself from payment by mistake. Arguably
it is not an "innocent party" if it has failed to take reasonable
precautions to avoid such payment. Yet, even if the government
is considered an innocent party here, the rule is justified by
the desirability of the widest possible distribution of the risk
of loss when one of two equally innocent parties must suffer
L.Q. 357 (1967). This article is the definitive treatment of postal money
orders. Professor O'Malley argues that money orders should be
treated like negotiable instruments, since the sovereignty and nonnegotiability bases on which they were originally distinguished are no
longer applicable. In support of this argument, he shows that average
annual sales of money orders during the five year period from 1961
to 1965 were 243,553,600, with a value of $4,771,907,270. For fiscal year
1966, the government received over $59 millions in revenues from sales
of money orders. During the period 1161 to 1965, 99% of the total
number of money orders issued, with 98% of the total value issued,
were handled not by post offices, but by commercial banks, paid through
the Federal Reserve System. Thus, it is readily apparent that money
orders have been injected into the normal bank collection processes,
and have become a part of the commercial paper currently in circulation.
28. Extending the finality of payment rule to postal money orders
would also increase the transferability, since private parties, protected
from forgery loss would be more willing to accept government instruments. See United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 131 F.2d 985 (10th Cir.
1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 774 (1943).
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from the wrongful acts of a third.29 In this instance, the government is in a superior position to bear the risks because of its
power to set rates.
Despite the desirability of its application of the commercial
paper law to money orders, the court failed to specify the nature
of the instrument created. The form of the postal money order
does not clarify the matter. One possible construction is to consider the purchaser of a money order a remitter, with the post
office issuing the order as both drawer and drawee. Under this
analysis, money orders would be analogous to both government
checks and bank cashier's checks.30 It is established that the
government when issuing checks drawn on itself is both drawer
and drawee, and that when such instruments are presented and
accepted for payment, the government cannot recover the amount
paid on the instrument under a theory of mistake.3 ' Such decisions have rested on the ground that the government is subject
to all the laws of commercial transactions governing private
citizens. 32 The application of negotiable instrument law to government checks and the judicial recognition given the analogy
between these instruments and government money orders3 3 support application of negotiable instrument law to government
money orders.
Postal money orders may also be viewed as being similar to
29. See Note, Forged Government Checks: Misallocation of Loss
YALE L.J. 1107 (1957).
30. A cashier's check is the primary obligation of the bank which

by the FederalCommon Law, 66

issues it, and it constitutes a written promise to pay upon demand. A
cashier's check is a bill of exchange drawn by a bank on itself, and
accepted in advance by the very act of issuance. In re Bank of United
States, 243 App. Div. 287, 291, 277 N.Y.S. 96, 100 (1935).
See also
U.C.C. § 3-802 (1) (a). If money orders are in fact purchases of drafts
by the government drawn on itself, it would be analogous to a purchased
cashier's check. Payment of cashier's checks cannot be stopped by the

party securing its issuance. See, e.g., Cross v. Exchange Bank Co., 110
Ohio App. 219, 168 N.E.2d 910 (1958); Scott v. Seaboard Sec. Co., 143

Wash. 514, 255 P. 660 (1927).
31. United States v. Guaranty Trust Co., 293 U.S. 340 (1934);
Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934); United States v. National
Exch. Bank, 270 U.S. 527 (1926).
32. See, e.g., United States v. National Exch. Bank, 270 U.S. 527
(1926); Cooke v. United States, 91 U.S. 389 (1875). Moreover, any defense which may be asserted against a private party may be raised
against the government when the government is a plaintiff. See, e.g.,
United States v. Norwegian Barque "Thelka," 266 U.S. 328 (1924); see
generally Developments in the Law-Remedies Against the United States
and Its Officials, 70 HARv. L. REv. 827 (1957).
33. United States v. Cambridge Trust Co., 300 F.2d 76 (1st Cir.
1962).

1106

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:1099

personal checks or bank money orders. A check3 4 is an order by
the drawer drawn on funds on deposit in a bank, directing payment to a person, his order, or the bearer. A postal money order
is an order drawn on funds deposited in the post office by the
purchaser directing a post office or bank to pay a person. The
purchaser may be seen as the drawer and the post office, the
drawee, calling on funds deposited with it. The distinction is
slight between an order drawn against a specific deposit, and an
order in a series of ongoing orders, drawn against a sustained
fund of money. The analogy between bank money orders and
personal checks has been adopted in recent decisions which have
held that the law of negotiable instrumnents is generally applicable to money orders. 35 Given the qualities of postal money orders, the analogy to checks and bank money orders is persuasive.
The only distinctions which can be drawn between bank and
postal money orders are the nature of the parties from whom
the instruments are procured, the statutory restrictions on endorsement of postal money orders, and the extent of the right to
stop payment. 38 None of these distinctions is of paramount significance, and it would be untenable to apply different rules
of law to each.
Under either a drawer-drawee or bank money order
analogy, the result obtained in the instant case is appropriate.
It is desirable both because it will shift the risk of loss from
the bona fide purchaser to the issuer of the instruments, who is
generally able to spread that risk by adjusting the instrument's
34. U.C.C. § 3-104(2) (b). A check fs, strictly speaking, a negotiable
instrument, bill of exchange, drawn on a bank, and payable on demand.
Irving Trust Co. v. Leff, 253 N.Y. 359, 262, 171 N.E. 569, 571 (App. Ct.
1930). See also The Law of Bank Checks-General Principles,78 BANK.
L.J. 277, 282-313 (1961).

35. See Garden Check Cashing Serv., Inc., v. First Nat'1 City
Bank, 38 Misc. 2d 623, 238 N.Y.S.2d 751 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. City 1963), rev'd,
46 Misc.2d 721, 260 N.Y.S.2d 718 (Sup. Ct. 1965), rev'd, 25 App. Div.2d
137, 267 N.Y.S.2d 698, aff'd mem., 18 N.Y.2d 941, 223 N.E.2d 566, 277
N.Y.S.2d 141 (1966). See also Note, PersonalMoney Orders and Tellers
Checks: Mavericks Under the UCC, 67 COLUm. L. REv. 524 (1967).
36. U.C.C. § 4-403. See, e.g., American Defense Soc'y, Inc. v. Sherman Nat'l Bank, 225 N.Y. 506, 122 N.E. 695 (1919).

A limited right to stop payment is, however, available to holders of
postal money orders as well. Postal Manual § 171.37 provides that if
an order was purchased because of false representations or fraud, or if
the payee is conducting a scheme for obtaining money fraudulently
through the mails, notification of the post office will permit a stoppayment on the instrument. The Postmaster General, at his own discretion, authorized such a stop-payment in Enterprise Say. Ass'n v.
Zumstein, 67 F. 1000 (6th Cir. 1895).

